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ARBITRARINESS: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT IDEA
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CAN'T BE DEFINED, AND
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE LAW IN GENERAL
R. George Wright *
I. INTRODUCTION
The crucial idea of "arbitrariness" runs throughout the law.
Processes of decision making and the outcomes of those processes
can both be considered arbitrary. Usually, but not always, the law
thinks of arbitrariness as undesirable., What arbitrariness
means, however, is surprisingly elusive. My main thesis, put ne-
gatively, is that it is futile to seek any standard definition of arbi-
trariness. No such standard definition is possible. This will prove
true not only of "arbitrary" and its synonyms in the law generally,
but even within particular narrower subject matter areas, such as
administrative law., Put positively, my main thesis is that legal
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapo-
lis. J.D., 1982, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; Ph.D., 1976, Indiana Uni-
versity; A.B. 1972, University of Virginia.
1. A number of judges have referred to the exercise of peremptory jury challenges as
an inherently arbitrary and capricious right, where arbitrariness is seen as at least neu-
tral in its legal effects. See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *353); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *353); Davis v. Minnesota, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1115, 1117-18 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 162
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892));
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)). The idea of arbi-
trariness in the peremptory challenge area, where no reasons generally need be given for
the challenge, is similar to how the idea of arbitrariness is used, more negatively, else-
where in the law. We are not, at least, taking a river bank and a savings bank to refer to
the same idea of "bank." See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 44 (1986).
2. See infra Section III.
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arbitrariness is, or at least should be, strongly and variously con-
textual,3 in ways I shall explain herein. 4
Briefly, I will argue that understanding arbitrariness in the
law requires an understanding of the conflict between "invarian-
tist" and "contextualist" approaches to the idea of the arbitrary.
Contextualism, as I shall define it below, offers the best available
understanding of how the idea of arbitrariness actually functions
in the law. As we better understand the forms of contextualism,
we then understand better the context-dependent multiple mean-
ings of arbitrary. In turn, better understanding the idea of arbi-
trariness helps us better understand the murkiness and contest-
edness of the law in general.
II. UNDERSTANDING CONTEXTUALISM
To give ourselves something to work with, let us begin with
what seems the most relevant definition of the arbitrary in gen-
eral, provided by the Oxford English Dictionary ("OED"). The
OED defines "arbitrary" as "[dierived from mere opinion or prefe-
rence; not based on the nature of things; hence, capricious, uncer-
tain, varying. '6
This definition seems to focus on the arbitrariness of an out-
come or of a substantive decision, rather than on the decision-
making process itself. But this need not trouble us. More worri-
some here is the reference to the arbitrary as "uncertain" or
"varying."7 No doubt, arbitrariness often takes the form of capri-
ciousness, with uncertainty or variability then resulting. Dining,
say, at a particular Italian restaurant on whose directory listing
one's jabbed finger happened to land exemplifies this sort of arbi-
trariness. Arbitrariness in this instance is seemingly linked with
3. See infra Section II.
4. See infra Sections II-IV.
5. See infra Section II.
6. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 602 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed.
1989). The OED also offers "[u]nrestrained in the exercise of will; of uncontrolled power or
authority, absolute; hence, despotic, tyrannical." Id. This alternative seems a bit strong for
some administrative decisions that are held arbitrary on grounds merely of perceived in-
sufficiencies in explanatory logic. See infra Section III. The most relevant OED definition
of "capricious," on the other hand, is as follows: "Full of, subject to, or characterized by ca-
price; guided by whim or fancy rather than by judgement or settled purpose; whimsical,
humoursome." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 869.
7. Id. at 602.
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uncertainty, variability, and unpredictability. But this is hardly
the only major form of arbitrariness.
In fact, some important forms of legal arbitrariness can be cha-
racterized in nearly opposite terms. In the extreme case, consider
an agency administrator who is, wherever relevant, driven by
some fixed political principle, or by what critics would refer to as
a rigid overriding political ideology. In the relevant range of cas-
es, that administrator's decisions would tend to be arbitrary-far
less clearly so "capricious"-even though they are driven by a un-
iformly settled bias or purpose, and are hardly random, unpre-
dictable, uncertain, or varying.8 Politics may certainly play a role
in generating arbitrary, but quite predictable, agency outcomesf
So it seems fair to say thus far that at a minimum, arbitrari-
ness may be a bit harder to define than one might have imagined.
One should carefully distinguish an arbitrary decision-making
process from a particular decision-making process that is arbitra-
rily unfair or biased. Arbitrariness itself may not be unfair or bi-
ased, and arbitrariness may not be the problem with unfair or bi-
ased decision making. Consider the well-known gender equal
protection case of Reed v. Reed.10 In Reed, the state arbitrarily
and uniformly preferred men over women of the same statutory
class as intestate estate administrators." The problem in Reed,
however, was in systematically treating women unequally with
men; 12 an arbitrary selection scheme actually might systematical-
ly tend to treat men and women equally. Given a male and female
candidate desiring to serve as administrator, a random toss of an
unbiased coin could be arbitrary, yet unfair and not violative of
anyone's equal protection rights.'3
8. See supra text accompanying note 6.
9. For a judicial finding of agency arbitrariness arguably linked to the very predicta-
bility, rather than any randomness or mere fancy, of partisan politics, see both the opinion
for the Court and Justice Rehnquist's opinion dissenting in part in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
10. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
11. Id. at 75. ('Section 15-314 [of Idaho's probate code] is restricted in its operation to
those situations where competing applications for letters of administration have been filed
by both male and female members of the same entitlement class established by § 15-312.
In such situations, § 15-314 provides that a different treatment be accorded to the appli-
cants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause.").
12. Id. at 76-77.
13. But cf. id. at 76. ("A classification [for equal protection purposes] must be reasona-
2010]
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But these sorts of problems with defining the idea of arbitrari-
ness in a standard dictionary sense can be managed. And no un-
avoidable vagueness of the idea of arbitrariness, by itself, makes
arbitrariness undefinable in a dictionary sense. Generally, va-
gueness of an idea creates uncertainties of application in close or
marginal cases, but this need not make the vague idea undefina-
ble. We can fairly assume that ideas like "bald" and "flat" are va-
gue1 4 but still definable in a dictionary sense.
What does create serious difficulty for a useful dictionary defi-
nition of a term such as arbitrariness is an especially high degree
of contextuality of the term. It is said that, generally, "contextual
themes are gaining increasing recognition these days. 11 Of
course, we have always seen the importance of context in some
general sense. We insist, for example, that our words "not be tak-
en out of context," whether we are ordinary citizens or judicial
opinion writers.' 6 "Contextualism," as we will be using the term,
will have a more distinctive meaning.
To begin to clarify the idea of contextualism, we can think
again of the idea of flatness, which we have already assumed is a
vague term. 17 Precisely where any given surface becomes or stops
being flat will be unclear, hence the vagueness of the meaning of
flat. But beyond this, more importantly, the meaning of "flat" will
also depend upon context and relevant purposes and interests.
Context, and the underlying purposes and interests at stake in
that context, will affect the actual standards for calling some-
thing flat. 18
Consider, for example, the flatness of an airport runway or a
country road, in contrast with the flatness of a glass table, or a
writing surface. Standards for flatness are, in a sense, inconsis-
ble, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.") (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
(emphasis added)).
14. See MARK TIMMONS, MORALITY WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: A DEFENSE OF ETHICAL
CONTEXTUALISM 112 (1999) (citing David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, 8 J.
PHIL. LOGIC 339 (1979), reprinted in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, at 244-45 (1983)).
15. Id. at 114.
16. See, e.g., Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) ("Judges
expect their pronunciamentos to be read in context...
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18. See TIMMONS, supra note 14, at 112 (citing Lewis, supra note 14, at 245-46).
[Vol. 44:839
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tent.19 We might call a particular runway or a particular country
road flat, and we might describe some particular glass table top
or a particular writing surface as not flat. And we might say all
this even if in some literal sense the latter objects were flatter
than the former-perhaps the table and the writing surface have
only mere scratches, few in number, whereas the former have the
bumpiness caused by half-inch surface irregularities, or changes
in elevation of even several feet. 20
We could thus imagine a standard ant having a tougher time
crossing a foot of runway or road than a foot of the table top or
the writing surface, yet we would continue to call the former flat
and the latter not flat. This would again be because differences in
context involve differences, and even contradictions, in standards
and meanings. And this is fundamentally because different pur-
poses and interests are at stake, themselves largely creating the
crucial differences in context. On a runway or country road, an
"abrupt" rise or fall in surface height of less than half of an inch
is, for most practical purposes, insignificant.21 Such a surface is
thus flat.2 2 But on a table top or writing surface, an abrupt rise or
fall of only an eighth of an inch or less may make the surface un-
suitable and thus not flat for a typical gracious display or for
writing.23 The contexts and their underlying purposes and inter-
ests differ in ways calling for different standards and meanings of
flatness.
The activities of taking off and landing an airplane, driving a
car, displaying an aesthetically pleasing furniture surface, and
writing smoothly and uninterruptedly involve different purposes
and interests, thus evoking different standards and largely con-
stituting different contexts. 24 Realistically, "flat" involves different
standards or criteria for invocation in these different contexts.
The meaning of "flat" varies to one degree or another with the
19. See PETER UNGER, IGNORANCE: A CASE FOR SKEPTICISM 58-59 (1975) (stating that
the term "flat" is absolute and thus "where we say that one surface is flatter than the oth-
er, we may paraphrase things like this: The first surface is either flat, though the second is
not or else it is closer to being flat than the second."); see also Lewis, supra note 14, at 245
(reasoning that a desk is flatter than pavement under a raised standard of precision).
20. See Unger, supra note 19, at 66.
21. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 245.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
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changes of context.25 There is in this sense no single meaning, de-
finition, or property of flatness. This overall logic amounts to
what we call contextualism in action.
I shall examine below how the idea of the arbitrary fits into
this contextualist pattern in a more complex, multidimensional
way.27 In the meantime, though, we should establish that flatness
is hardly the only, or the most important, example for which
meaning varies, even inconsistently, with changing contexts.
Consider this further example, involving the idea of knowing:
Suppose ... that having seen my children a minute ago, I assert "I
know my children are in the garden." My neighbour Harold then
says, "Good, because an escaped prisoner is seeking hostages near-
by." I may then appropriately claim, "On second thoughts, [sic] I do
not know, I should check carefully." Standards for knowledge appear
to have shifted .... 28
The argument being made by this paragraph is that the parent
has indeed changed his or her mind, but has in some sense not
necessarily contradicted herself. We need not accept or reject this
example. My point is merely to illustrate the general logic of the
argument. The idea here is that the insertion of a serious and
immediate possible threat to the children has dramatically
changed and raised the stakes. As a result, the relevant context
has now changed. Before, with a background assumption of no
unusual danger to the children, it would be standard, proper, and
responsible for a parent to say that she "knew" the children were
in the garden if they had been seen there a minute before. But
the addition of the new serious hostage-taking threat to the child-
ren changes the context, and thereby the very standards for
knowing. Based on this theory, the parent could know in the one
context, but not know in the other, and in some sense not be con-
25. See id. at 245-46.
26. Cf. John Greco, What's Wrong with Contextualism?, 58 PHIL. Q. 416, 426 (2008),
available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120084229/issue ("[Ihf the word
"knowledge' picks out different properties in different contexts, then there is no property of
knowledge proper. Rather, there is only knowledge language, which picks out any number
of properties in different contexts.").
27. See infra Section III.
28. Bruce W. Brower, ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward Craig. Ed.,
1998) (entry for "Contextualism, Epistemological"), available at http://www.rep.routledge.
com/article/PO58?authstatuscode=202. Such cases are often discussed in terms of a
claimed contextualism of knowledge, or epistemic contextualism. Our concern is more with
the contextualism of meaning, or semantic contextualism.
[Vol. 44:839
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tradicting herself, because of the justifiable changes in standards
for knowing based on the dramatic changes in interests at stake. 21
Nothing really depends upon this particular example, but we
might add to its plausibility by noticing that we generally set dif-
ferent standards for knowing in different contexts. We might say,
for example, that a child knows how water boils based merely on
the child's brief, simple quiz or game show answer. We might also
say, however, that a quantum chemistry graduate student-
surprisingly or disappointingly-does not know how water boils,
based on his exam answer, even though the graduate student
knows all that the child knows, and, indeed, well beyond what the
child knows. 0
Importantly, as it turns out, our words vary in the degree to
which their meaning varies with changes in context. We can im-
agine a simple continuum. At one end of the continuum are terms
whose meaning does not vary much with changes in context. Or
more precisely, it is hard to relevantly change the context in
which such terms appear. Such terms we could classify as strong-
ly invariantist.31 Terms such as "less than one meter in length" or
"below freezing" might fall toward the invariantist end of this
simple continuum. These phrases' meanings might well change
from context to context, but typically less so, than the term flat.32
Flatness would fall more toward the contextualist end of the con-
tinuum, with invariantism and strong contextualism thus work-
ing as opposites. 3
Arbitrariness and its close synonyms, I will argue, fall in com-
plex ways toward the contextualist extreme. The meaning of arbi-
29. Nor would we say of this example that two completely different senses of "know"
are involved, as in the case of a river bank and a savings bank. See supra note 1.
30. See Peter Ludlow, Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology, in
CONTEXTUALISM IN PHILOSOPHY: KNOWLEDGE, MEANING, AND TRUTH 11, 11 (Gerhard
Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2005) (suggesting that high standards for "knowing" are set in
both philosophy classes and in "a court of law"). I note briefly that the discussion of
changes in word meaning below will not depend on the separate matter of what are called
"indexicals," including words such as "I" and "you," whose concrete, substantive meaning
may obviously also vary depending upon speaker and context. See John Perry, Indexicals,
Apr. 23, 2000, http://www-csli.stanford.edu/-jperry/PHILPAPERS/demon-enc.pdf.
31. For discussion of epistemological invariantism, see Brower, supra note 28; Preyer
& Peter, Introduction to CONTEXTUALISM IN PHILOSOPHY: KNOWLEDGE, MEANING, AND
TRUTH, supra note 30, at 2; Jessica Brown, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Know-
ledge Norm for Practical Reasoning, 42 NOOS 167, 167 (2008).
32. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
33. See sources cited supra note 28.
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trary will change significantly as context and the underlying,
perhaps conflicting, purposes, interests, and stakes vary. The
significance, degree, and frequency of the changes of meaning of
arbitrary lead to the conclusion that it is more misleading than
helpful to imagine that arbitrary has a standard, convenient, le-
gal definition," even in particular legal contexts, such as judicial
review of administrative actions.3 5
Before I address the idea of arbitrariness in some important
contexts, I should clarify a bit further how, in general, one con-
text differs from another. Contextualism 36 holds that our lan-
guage is interest-dependent.3 7 More broadly, we can say that "con-
text itself is to be understood in terms of such things as...
interests, purposes, expectations, and so forth."38 The essential
presence of sometimes conflicting interests and purposes sug-
gests, naturally, that something is at stake in any context, and
that the importance of the stakes may vary with context,39 with
some contexts presenting "low-stakes situations" and others
"high-stakes situations. '40
Without pressing the legal issues just yet, we can easily see
that the interests and purposes involved in cases of alleged arbi-
trariness can vary in their gravity. The denial of a vacationer's
recreational fishing license and the imposition of the death penal-
ty might, in particular cases, both be arbitrary, but we can see
that the gravity or seriousness of the interests at stake in the two
cases can vary substantially.41 We shall see below how such con-
siderations can lead to the elevation of the standards for what
counts as arbitrary, or, on the other hand, how they can lead to
34. See infra Sections III-IV.
35. See infra Section III.
36. Again, our primary focus is not on the contextualist nature of, say, knowing some-
thing, or on something's being morally right or wrong, but on the contextualism of mean-
ing, on what is called semantic contextualism.
37. See Greco, supra note 26, at 417.
38. Patrick Rysiew, Epistemic Contextualism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, Sept. 7, 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/
(focusing on attributor epistemic contextualism).
39. See Brown, supra note 31, at 167-68.
40. Greco, supra note 26, at 418.
41. For reference to the idea of greater or lesser relevant variability among contexts,
see Ernest Sosa, Contextualism, Epistemic, Recent Work on, ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Craig ed., 1998), available at http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/
PO6l?ssid=1079207542kn=l#.
[Vol. 44:839
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the relaxation of such standards, and thereby alter the meaning
of arbitrary.42
One necessary complication is that in any decision-making con-
text, more than one common interest or purpose will likely be in
play. A given actor may hold more than one interest. Different
persons may hold different and perhaps conflicting interests, of
different intensity, at different times. Thus, even the judge may
have some interests distinct from the litigating parties (including
the government) during the trial, and another set of interests
during sentencing.43 We could easily add to the judge's various
possible interests if there is an appeal of the decision.
More generally, legal contexts can be identified and described
by reference to the purposes and interests deemed to be at stake
by any interested person. Whether all parties have fully unders-
tood their own interests, or those of other parties, is a possible
complication. As a further complication, some persons may have
interests that actually refer mainly to the interests of other per-
sons. Thus, in addition to the litigants themselves, other persons
similarly situated, the broader public, legislative oversight com-
mittees, the government, 4 agency decision-making officials or
agency branches,45 trial and appellate courts and private counsel,
journalists, scholars, and sundry critics may also have overlap-
ping and conflicting interests at stake.46
This is not to suggest that all such purposes and interests are
equally important and should equally affect the meaning of arbi-
trary or any other legal term. But the potential for conflicts over
the meaning of important legal terms on this basis is not hard to
understand. In the extreme case, the conflicting purposes and in-
42. See infra Section III.
43. Greco, supra note 26, at 436.
44. For the classic reference to multiple and in a sense conflicting possible govern-
ment interests in an administrative case, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)) (articulating a procedural
due process balancing test).
45. See, for example, the various potentially conflicting interests internal to the ad-
ministrative agency itself in the immigration case of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 41-48 (1950), superseded by statute, Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951,
Pub. L. No. 81-843, ch. 1052, § 3, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, as recognized in Ardestani v. INS,
502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991).
46. For more general reference to the problem of "whose interests matter?," see, for
example, Brian Weatherson, Questioning Contextualism, in ASPECTS OF KNOWING:
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ESSAYS 133 (Stephen Hetherington ed., 2006).
2010]
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terests of prosecutors, death penalty defendants, and other actors
almost guarantee continuing conflict over the proper meaning of
"arbitrary" in the context of the death penalty and its adjudica-
tion.47 In general, we should expect death penalty defendants to
argue for a more "rigorized," higher-standard understanding of
arbitrary, in various respects, and prosecutors for the contrary.8
There is certainly much more to say about contextualism in
general. 49 But it is more important for our purposes to now apply
47. In contrast, in a case with few conflicting purposes and interests, we should expect
less conflict over the meaning of "arbitrary."
48. By contrast, the idea of procedural due process, or literally the process that is
"due" is arguably by its own dictionary definition already inherently contextualized and
sensitive to interests. Due process itself may mean the process that is due, fitting or ap-
propriate in the particular context, or under the particular circumstances. "Due" here
functions like a placeholder. We see this played out in the explicit interest-focused contex-
tualism of the Eldridge three-part balancing test. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (citing
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71).
For the sake of a clear contrast, consider the idea of being "below freezing." No doubt
even the idea of "below freezing" has some contextual element, but far less prominently.
The idea of "below freezing" will usually be clearly established in advance-as we often
falsely imagine "arbitrary" to be-and then applied to various sets of circumstances. The
meat storage locker, the outdoor temperature in Frostbite Falls, interstellar space, and the
carton of ice cream may all count as "below freezing," uniformly applied across the cases.
"Below freezing" will thus have a largely pre-contextual meaning in this sense. Due
process, has, by contrast, a meaning that inherently refers to interests in their contexts.
And the idea of the "arbitrary" makes no such explicit contextual reference, but is various-
ly defined, in accordance with the more or less conflicting particular interests, in varying
contexts.
49. Contextualism is generally thought of as either a mild form of, or as a constructive
response to, relativism or skepticism. See, e.g., Preyer & Peter, supra note 31, at 3
("[Clontextualism is a mild form of relativism about the truth of sentences"); Mark Ri-
chard, Contextualism and Relativism, 119 PHIL. STUD. 215, 215 (2004) ("[C]ontextualism
about knowledge, being a sort of relativism, seems to have trouble accounting for epistem-
ic disagreement."); see also, e.g., Greco, supra note 26. But cf. Berit Brogaard, Moral Con-
textualism and Moral Relativism, 58 PHIL. Q. 385, 385 (2008) (suggesting moral contex-
tualism need not involve genuine relativism); Michael Williams, Why (Wittgensteinian)
Contextualism Is Not Relativism, 4 EPISTEME 93, 93 (2007) ("I deny that this contextualist
view amounts to epistemic relativism. On the contrary, contextualism is the cure for all
skeptical temptations, relativism included."). Epistemic contextualism is thus sometimes
thought of in contrast not only to seeking some secure foundational truth, to a somehow
mutually supportive coherentist network of beliefs, and as well to skepticism, since stan-
dards for knowing are thought to vary, with greater and lesser rigor or demandingness,
according to context. Skepticism, for example, loses its bite if the proper standards for
knowing something, in some specified context are easily met.
For a discussion of additional critiques of some forms of contextualism, see, for example,
Berit Brogaard, In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know', 86 AUSTRALASIAN J.
PHIL. 439, 440-42 (2008) (discussing the appeal of invariantism), and Albert W.
Musschenga, Empirical Ethics, Context-Sensitivity, and Contextualism, 30 J. MED. & PHIL.
467, 484 (2005) ("A common objection against theories such as epistemic contextualism is
that they do not provide room for criticising the internal moralities of practices."). Such
criticisms, whether otherwise sound or not, are of limited relevance for our purposes.
[Vol. 44:839
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the basic semantic contextualist framework to the idea of arbitra-
riness, not only within the crucial administrative law context,5 0
but also within the death penalty context,51 for the sake of con-
trast.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ARBITRARINESS FROM CONTEXT TO CONTEXT
For legal contexts generally, a decision is often thought of as
arbitrary when it is "founded on prejudice or preference rather
than on reason or fact."5 2 One problem for such a definition is that
arbitrary decisions can also be based on genuinely unrecognized
logical or evidentiary gaps, murky reasoning, or flawed methodol-
ogy.53 These can be inconspicuous mistakes, hardly resulting from
prejudice or willful preference. Another problem is that narrowly
politically-driven outcomes may reflect not only prejudice or pre-
ference, but also a substantial component of "reason or fact,"5 4 de-
spite their arbitrariness. Similarly, if we legally define the related
term "capricious" in terms of "unpredictable or impulsive beha-
vior,"5 5 we may lose track of the possibility of arbitrariness as a
rigid, systematic, ideological bias, which may be both predictable
and far from capricious or impulsive.5 6
As with arbitrariness in more general contexts, 57 the legal dic-
tionaries get us off to a questionable start in thinking about arbi-
trariness in the law.5 8 In the crucial context of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the idea of arbitrariness is not
defined, but is given a certain coloration by closely associated
language.59 Thus, courts reviewing many forms of agency rule-
making and adjudication are called upon to consider whether the
50. See infra Section III.
51. See infra Section IV.
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
53. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(discussing the rule-making process of the especially technical Clean Water Act).
54. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009).
55. Id. at 239.
56. See, for example, the veiled debate over the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") political bias, in Allentown Mack Sales & Services v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 363-
66 (1998).
57. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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agency acted in a way that was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."60
Arbitrariness in this APA sense and in other legal senses may
be either substantive" or procedural2 As for what legal arbitra-
riness itself means, we might initially assume that some light will
be shed by the adjacent statutory terms. The interpretive canon
of noscitur a sociis suggests that the meaning of arbitrary might
be clarified by the textual company it keeps.63 But in the case of
arbitrary in the APA, the typical neighboring terms may actually
be in some respects too close in meaning to arbitrary to shed
much additional light.
Consider, for example, possible relationships between arbitrary
and capricious decision making on the one hand, and unreasona-
bleness in decision making on the other. In at least some APA
contexts, it has been argued, "the difference between the 'arbi-
trary and capricious' and 'reasonableness' standards is not of
great pragmatic consequence. 6 4 Similarly, courts have doubted
whether there is much consistent, practical difference between
the arbitrary and capricious standard on the one hand, and a
"clearly erroneous" or "clear error of judgment" standard on the
other."
60. Id.; see also Alaska Dep't Envtl. of Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496-97
(2004); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002).
61. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199
(2003) ("[T]he "substantive result' of a referendum may be invalid if it is "arbitrary and
capricious'....") (quoting Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976))).
62. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Expla-
nation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 318-89 (1996) ("[T]he 'arbitrary or
capricious' test regulates an agency's decisionmaking process by ensuring that the agency
reaches its conclusions through a rational decisionmaking mechanism." (citing Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983)).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1839 (2008)
("[Tihe commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis ... counsels that a word is given more pre-
cise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated." (citing Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961); 2A N. Singer & Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (7th ed. 2007)).
64. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23 (1989) (citing Manaso-
ta-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687, 692 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986) ("As a practical matter ...
the differences between the "reasonableness' and "arbitrary and capricious' standards of
review are often difficult to discern.")).
65. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 35 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (noting
some courts "use the 'clear error of judgment' phrase as a shorthand summary of 'arbitrary
and capricious' review," while others apparently equate "arbitrary and capricious" and
"clearly erroneous") (citations omitted).
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Even more curiously, there is actually uncertainty over wheth-
er there is any consistent and practical difference between the
arbitrary and capricious standard and the "substantial evidence
in the record as a whole" standard. One might imagine that since
the substantial evidence standard presupposes an exclusive writ-
ten record for review, it could be more rigorous in some respects
than arbitrary and capricious review. 6 But there is actually much
uncertainty over whether these two standards differ significantly
in practice. 61
We thus discover that within administrative law, arbitrary and
capricious often seems practically indistinguishable from various
other related standards of review, even while the sentiment re-
mains that the standards are or should be somehow distinguisha-
ble.68 What explanation can be offered for this frequent sense of
these standards' vague practical equivalence, with occasional
doubts and exceptions?
From my basic thesis, this sense of a frequent but occasionally
evaporating practical equivalence between arbitrariness and al-
ternative standards of review is not surprising. In my view, there
is simply no reasonably fixed definitional meaning for arbitrary
and its closest cognates. The meaning of arbitrary is actually a
variety of meanings, dependent upon variations in contexts,
which reflect differences in purposes and interests, and the gravi-
ty thereof-the stakes-according to the various actors directly or
indirectly involved. 69 Where the stakes are thought to be high, ar-
bitrariness review may be correspondingly demanding, as rigor-
ous in that context as some more formally demanding standard.
But it will also be possible to compare arbitrariness review in a
low stakes context with more rigorous review under some other
standard. And since no meaning for arbitrary and its closest syn-
66. See id. at 37 n.79.
67. Id. ("[S]ome have noted that in reviewing the evidence relied upon in agency pro-
ceedings, the two standards often seem to merge." (citing Assoc'd Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc.
v. U.S. Dep't of Labor 487, F.3d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.))); Thomas J.
Miles and Cass. R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
761, 764 (2008) ("In practice ... review under the substantial evidence standard is essen-
tially the same as review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, though it is some-
times thought that review for substantial evidence is somewhat more searching."); see also
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 160-63 (John F. Duffy
& Michael Herz eds., 2005) [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW].
68. See supra 63-66 and accompanying text.
69. See supra Section II.
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onyms can be pinned down, there will always be a sense that "ar-
bitrariness" can be the practical equivalent of other standards,
but it cannot be so regarded in an exceptionless way.
The mistaken quest for a decisive answer in this respect is
based on the false belief that in the typical administrative con-
text, and perhaps elsewhere, arbitrary has some recognizable, if
vague, standard definitional meaning. This is incorrect, but we
can see how many are thus misled not only by legal 0 and other
dictionaries, 71 but also by widely recognized case law. Often, the
case law can be interpreted to lend an apparently invariantist
cast to the idea of arbitrariness.7 2
To make matters worse, to the extent that standards such as
"clearly erroneous," "unreasonable," and "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence" are indistinguishable in practice from an arbi-
trariness standard, the indefinite meaning of arbitrariness may
well, to some degree, be manifested in the jurisprudence of these
standards as well. The meanings of "arbitrariness," as well as of
"clearly erroneous," "unreasonable," and "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence," might well all turn out to be highly contextua-
lized. The unavoidable murkiness of "arbitrariness" would thus
simply expand.
In contrast, though, the widely cited State Farm case seems to
offer some apparently flat, simple principles that might seem to
support an invariantist approach to the meaning of arbitrary in
typical administrative cases.7 3 The Court prefaced its discussion
in State Farm with the qualifying language of what is
"In]ormally" the case. 74 But with that general, non-contextual ca-
veat, the Court then listed circumstances of which each seem suf-
ficient to establish arbitrariness.7 5 None of the circumstances or
principles seem bound to any substantive legal context. Thus, the
Court declared:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
70. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
73. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-
43 (1983).
74. Id. at 43.
75. Id.
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consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.1
6
Each of these circumstances reads literally as normally sufficient
for a finding of arbitrariness. There does not appear to be any
sense of how the meaning of these enumerated circumstances
might depend upon substantive context. There is no suggestion,
for example, that "implausible" is context-dependent. Certainly
there is no assumption that this listing, even in conjunction with
additional language from State Farm," is exhaustive of the ways
in which an agency decision can be arbitrary. But each of these
listed considerations would generally seem to suffice for arbitra-
riness.
An agency's violation of a weaker, less stringent version of
these considerations could also be found arbitrary. 9 Perhaps an
agency has considered an important aspect of the problem, but
has inadequately done so.80 That agency decision might also be
held arbitrary. My point is not that the Court's discussion of arbi-
trariness in State Farm is incomplete. Instead, my point is that in
offering supposedly sufficient criteria for administrative arbitra-
riness that are largely independent of substantive context, the
Court has attempted the impossible. Within and beyond typical
administrative contexts, arbitrariness cannot be usefully defined
without crucial reference to context, and ultimately to the pur-
poses and interests of one or more concerned actors., Arbitrari-
ness will thus be shown to be far removed from fitting any inva-
riantist or dictionary-type model.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 42-44.
78. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Pwr. Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 619
(2d Cir. 1965) (less than ten pages of agency discussion of a gas turbine alternative re-
jected by the agency).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. Thus, where the contexts are more alike, we would expect less variation in the
meanings of arbitrariness. The greater the dissimilarities among contexts, the more clear-
ly inadequate any single dictionary-type judicial definition of arbitrariness will be.
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State Farms2 however, is hardly the only major case that
adopts an invariantist, context-insensitive 3 approach to arbitra-
riness. Elsewhere there are what appear to be sensible, perhaps
nearly exceptionless, principles that might supposedly suffice for
a finding of arbitrariness, again apparently regardless of context.
Ultimately, though, common-sense, dictionary-style invariantism
conceals the deeper reality that the very meanings of arbitrari-
ness will depend crucially upon variations in substantive context.
As a further example of attempted invariantism, the Court, cit-
ing State Farm, recently linked an agency's "unexplained incon-
sistency" in interpretation to a possible inference of arbitrariness,
largely apart from substantive context.' More strongly, "an agen-
cy that departs from its previous rules will be found to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously if it fails 'to supply a reasoned analy-
sis for the change ... ,"'85 Similarly, an agency "change that does
not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation" is
suspect.s6 And without sensitivity to the context of the "purpose"
in question, the detention of aliens for improper purposes is also
said to be arbitrary and capricious.8 7 More generally, decisions
that pass beyond a certain degree of irrationality8 or that "ref-
lec[t] no policy"89 have also been said to be arbitrary. These all
seem like invariant rules or principles, independent of any fur-
ther context.
82. For further discussion of State Farm, see GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL
REVIEW, supra note 67, at 180-82 and infra note 101.
83. For the sake of clarity, invariantism does not imply that the invariant term can
somehow bypass being actually applied in a given context. The idea of invariantism is in-
stead that there is a useful, core, uniform meaning of some term that does not itself signif-
icantly vary when applied in various contexts. If we take "below freezing" to be toward the
invariantist end of the spectrum, we must still test the air in the backyard, or whatever
other context, in applying the term "below freezing."
84. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Broad X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57).
85. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 752 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42).
86. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (citing United States v.
Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670-75 (1973); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 295 (1974)).
87. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532-33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Zadvy-
das v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998);
Comm'r v. Estate of Hubert, 520 U.S. 93, 130 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See Vieth v. Juberlirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962)); id. at 320-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Baker, 369 U.S. at 226).
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The problem with these principles is not that they are wrong
on the merits or even that they are subject to exception. Rather,
the problem is their tendency to encourage the belief that arbi-
trary has a capturable meaning largely independent of changes in
substantive, interest- and purpose-based context. One could say
that the problem is in the Court's implication that "arbitrary" can
be found largely apart from this context, just as one can find a
temperature to be "below freezing."90 There are, however, crucial,
substantive variations in context to some extent in administrative
law cases and even more clearly in other cases applying the idea
of arbitrariness where the interest- and purpose-based stakes
vary.
For instance, the administrative law case of Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 91 is a classic example. When the
Court discusses the arbitrary and capricious standard, there is a
curious, indeed eerie, vacillation in tone. 92 To overdramatize,
there is something of a repeated Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde trans-
formation in the Court's characterization of the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard. It is possible that the Court's odd vacillation
may reflect a vague, unarticulated sense that context may make a
difference in the very meaning of "arbitrary."
Overton Park involved a very modestly explained decision by
the Secretary of Transportation to authorize federal funds for a
highway project running through Overton Park.9 3 Applying arbi-
trary and capricious review, 94 the Court began, in suitably defe-
rential fashion, by observing that "[ciertainly, the Secretary's de-
cision is entitled to a presumption of regularity."95 But then there
was almost immediately a transformation of the standard into a
less deferential sort: "[T]hat presumption is not to shield his ac-
tion from a thorough, probing, in-depth review."96
The Court then provided a sort of mixed, or "mid-
transformation," standard: "[T]he court must consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
90. See supra notes 48-83.
91. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
92. See id. at 416.
93. Id. at 406.
94. Id. at 416.
95. Id. at 415.
96. Id.
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and [more deferentially] whether there has been a clear error of
judgment."97 The Court concluded with a final transformation of
the standard, from a Mr. Hyde-like, less deferential perspective-
"this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful"9S-to a
Dr. Jekyll-like, more deferential standard-"the ultimate stan-
dard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."99 What I term here
the "less deferential, Mr. Hyde-like" language is associated, un-
derstandably, with what has been called an aggressive judicial
"hard-look" review of agency determinations.100
The precise extent of difference between the Court's more defe-
rential and less deferential hard-look review language is unim-
portant for our purposes. Nor need we argue that there is a strict
separation or dichotomy between deferential and hard-look re-
view. 0' It does seem clear, however, that Jekyll and Hyde are not
the same personality. Certainly, the Overton Park Court has as-
signed realistically inconsistent meanings to the idea of the arbi-
97. Id. at 416.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of the "hard-look" approach to review of agency action, see Miles
& Sunstein, supra note 67, at 761-63 ("The goal of hard look review was to police agency
decisions for genuine arbitrariness."). See generally Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and
the "Hard Look" Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151 (2006). For further examples of arguably Jekyll-
and-Hyde language regarding administrative arbitrariness, see Hayward v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 536 F.3d 376, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (observing on the one hand that
"[tihe arbitrary and capricious standard is 'highly deferential'" and on the other hand that
"a searching and careful review" is required (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.,
401 U.S. at 415-16 (1971)); United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1983));
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Pwr. Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 413 (1983) (determining
"whether the agency adequately considered the factors relevant" and "whether the agency
committed a 'clear error of judgment'") (emphasis added) (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S.
at 416).
101. Arguably the most distinctive Supreme Court case applying a "hard look" review
is Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See
supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text; Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007) ("[W]e will not vacate an agency's decision unless it 're-
lied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs coun-
ter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.'" (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at
43)); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("In State Farm, we reviewed an
agency's rescission of a rule under the same 'arbitrary and capricious' standard by which
the promulgation of a rule under the relevant statute was to be judged. . . ." (citing State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 41-42)); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 332-33 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).
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trary. The Court thus has failed in any attempt to provide an un-
equivocal, dictionary-style meaning of "arbitrary." The broader
point, though, is that the Court's validation of both more deferen-
tial and less deferential language may amount to an initial, ten-
tative step toward subject-matter contextualism.
Some courts in important administrative law cases have ven-
tured beyond the mere contrasting Jekyll and Hyde attitudes le-
gitimized by Overton Park. The well-known Ethyl Corp. case, for
example, emphasized that the arbitrariness standard "is a highly
deferential one," that it "requires affirmance if a rational basis
exists for the agency's decision," and that the standard somehow
accommodates both the searching and careful nature of the arbi-
trariness inquiry with the recognition that "the ultimate standard
of review is a narrow one.' 0 2
What is interesting about Ethyl Corp. is that the court could
have done a more substantively contextualized analysis of arbi-
trariness. The court could have taken the practical stakes in-
volved-fuel efficiency versus any adverse health effects of lead
fuel additives"°-to be potentially high. And if the practical
stakes and interests are assumed to be high, this consideration by
itself might suggest a more rigorous standard of judicial review
for arbitrariness.
Consider a previous example. We saw the standards for know-
ing of one's children's safety clearly being raised as soon as there
was any recognized potential threat to the children. 0 4 Once the
stakes were raised, the parent no longer knew that the children
were safe. So, we should imagine, it might be with the law of ar-
bitrariness: as the practical purposes and interests-the stakes-
increase, so would the level of judicial review, and with it the very
meaning of arbitrariness. 05
What limited any upward adjustment of the meaning of arbi-
trary in Ethyl Corp. was the court's recognition of the unusual
scientific and technical complexity of the underlying facts, and
102. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (citing Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 290 (1974); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)).
103. See id. at 7-9 (explaining how adding lead compounds to fuel results in lead emis-
sions and adverse human health effects).
104. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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the court's assumed lack of competence in assessing such evi-
dence, compared to that of the agency's technical experts. °6 In the
words of Chief Judge Bazelon's concurrence, "[blecause substan-
tive review of mathematical and scientific evidence by technically
illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable, I continue to believe
we will do more to improve administrative decision-making by
concentrating our efforts on strengthening administrative proce-
dures."0 7
However, courts might correspondingly impose a more demand-
ing meaning on arbitrary where they felt entirely comfortable
with the underlying factual issues, or where they suspected sys-
tematic agency bias of some sort. 10 8 This would be in some sense a
contextually driven change in the meaning of arbitrary in an ad-
ministrative case. The context at issue, though, would not refer to
the substantive context, reflecting the underlying interests and
stakes of parties, but merely to grounds for changes in the degree
of technical confidence felt by the reviewing courts. Raising or lo-
wering the bar for arbitrariness on such grounds still omits most
of the more interesting differences we find in the meanings of ar-
bitrariness depending upon subject-matter or interest-based con-
text.
IV. SUBJECT-MATTER AND INTEREST-BASED CONTEXTUALISM:
WHAT "ARBITRARY" MEANS IN THE DEATH PENALTY
AND OTHER CASES
The stakes in administrative law cases can vary from a delay
in a temporary recreational fishing license to loss of a fortune or
of control over a major business enterprise. But decisions as to
possible arbitrariness are also made in death penalty cases, and
the death penalty is unique. 10 9 The uniqueness of the death penal-
106. 541 F.2d at 36-37. Thus the court modestly recognized that "[wie must look at the
decision not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we are qualified neither by train-
ing nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty of
holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality." Id. at 36; see also id. at 66-
69 (Bazelon, C.J. concurring).
107. Id. at 67 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring).
108. See, e.g., N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1988)
(stating that despite deference owed to agency, "we think that [Health and Human Servic-
es] suffers from tunnel vision when it sees only Medicare and ignores the Medicaid pro-
gram.").
109. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) (noting the "uniqueness of
the death penalty" (quoting Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.3d 369, 375 (10th Cir. 1982), cert de-
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ty in terms of the interests at stake means that in some respects,
death penalty contexts will be substantively unique contexts.
Now, it is technically possible that the meaning of arbitrariness
might not significantly change even in the unique death penalty
context. Perhaps courts could apply the same idea of arbitrari-
ness as in all other contexts, with making minimal adjustments
as technically necessary in death penalty cases. But this seems
extremely unlikely. If what counts as knowing that a child is safe
varies with the actual recognized threat-level, it is difficult to be-
lieve that the meaning of arbitrary will not crucially vary as be-
tween casual fishing license and irrevocable death penalty cases.
Even a brief examination of some of the case law suggests that
what arbitrary most typically means in a garden-variety adminis-
trative case differs from what arbitrary means in death penalty
contexts. These differences are real differences in meaning, and
not merely in the concrete consequences of applying the same
meaning of arbitrary in different contexts.
A contrasting illustration may be helpful here. Someone who
wins fifty dollars as the top prize in a lottery, and another person
who wins five million dollars as the top prize in another lottery,
have both won their respective lotteries in roughly the same
sense. They have each won, in roughly the sense of being uncon-
testedly awarded the top prize among multiple entrants. The
meaning of the term win is thus roughly the same, even if the
practical, lifestyle consequences or prestige of winning for each
differ radically. This continuity of meaning is not preserved, how-
ever, in the legal uses of the term arbitrary.
As a matter of the standard boilerplate language of death pe-
nalty procedure, no sentencing process can be tolerated that in-
volves a substantial risk that the death penalty "would be in-
flicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."110 The test in the
death penalty context thus seems to be not whether the process or
nied, 459 U.S. 1211 (1983)); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1027 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment requires comparative proportional-
ity review '"[b]ecause of the uniqueness of the death penalty"' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.))); Blystone v. Penn-
sylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 314 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at
188 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
110. See Turner v. California, 789 P.2d 887 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1053,
1054 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
20101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
outcome was really arbitrary, but whether the process created
even a substantial risk of arbitrariness. Here, the standard has
shifted from arbitrariness itself to something more like a "sub-
stantial risk of arbitrariness" standard."' In this, the meaning of
"arbitrary," as in "arbitrary and capricious," clearly varies as be-
tween death penalty contexts and the more typical, lower stakes,
routine, administrative contexts.
As it has evolved, the modern capital sentencing process has
become divided into "the eligibility phase and the selection
phase."112 In the eligibility phase, commonly, specified aggravat-
ing factors are considered in order to narrow the pool of those de-
fendants deemed deserving of the death penalty.113 In direct con-
trast, the selection phase emphasizes a far less constrained, less
guided, or less limited individualized examination of any relevant
mitigating evidence, with far more room for jury discretion.114
For our purposes, it is relevant that arbitrariness is feared
where jury discretion is during the eligibility phase, but arbitra-
riness is far less feared in allowing the jury to consider mitigating
evidence during the selection phase.115 Arbitrariness in death pe-
nalty cases thus takes on, perhaps fully justifiably, an oddly
asymmetric quality. In these cases, arbitrariness breaks down in-
to "positive" arbitrariness and "negative" arbitrariness. Arbitrary
inclusion at the eligibility phase is impermissible,11 6 but arbitrary
exclusion at the selection phase is considered far less objection-
111. See id.; Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974 (1994) ("We have held, under cer-
tain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision
creates an unreasonable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capri-
cious . .. .") (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972)); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 530 (1997) (citing Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
112. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971).
113. Id. (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72).
114. See id. at 275-76 (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73).
115. See id.; see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 7 (1994) ("'States cannot limit
the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to
impose the penalty.'") (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987)).
116. Thus, in imposing the death penalty, '"channeling and limiting of the sentencer's
discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for
sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' Ring v. Arizo-
na, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (quoting Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988));
see also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470 (1993) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,
774 (1990)).
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able. 117 By contrast, we see nothing approaching this ambivalence
and asymmetry in typical administrative cases.
Again, I have no objection to this unusual contextual asymme-
try of the role and meaning of arbitrariness. Discretion at the
death penalty eligibility phase is not merely to be used well, or
not "abused,"1'8 but is to be minimized from the beginning, until,
at a distinct later stage, it is invoked in the cause of leniency. 119
This unique tension in the realm of arbitrariness and its con-
trol has been duly noted in the case law,12 and led memorably to
Justice Blackmun's death penalty epiphany in Callins v. Col-
lins. 2 Referring to the attempt to somehow properly combine un-
iformity and individualized consideration in death penalty cases,
Justice Blackmun concluded that "even this approach is unac-
ceptable: It simply reduces, rather than eliminates, the number of
people subject to arbitrary sentencing."' 22 Apparently, arbitrari-
ness in any degree in this distinctive substantive context out-
weighs any affirmative value in the sentencing process operating
non-arbitrarily in any other respects. This is typically not paral-
leled in other contexts, including many of the most typical admin-
istrative contexts.
Looking to the death penalty future, Justice Blackmun then
reported that "I am more optimistic, though, that this Court
eventually will conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness
while preserving fairness 'in the infliction of [death] is so plainly
doomed to failure that it-and the death penalty-must be aban-
doned altogether. ''123 The idea that arbitrariness, in any degree,
outweighs all other considerations at stake in death penalty cases
is an extreme example of a broader pattern in the death penalty
117. See infra note 123.
118. Compare the conjunction of arbitrariness, capriciousness, and the abuse, as dis-
tinct from the exercise, of discretion in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2006).
119. See supra note 111.
120. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 360 (1993) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
121. 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1141, 1152-59 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1152.
123. Id. at 1159 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
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context. Here, because of the unique gravity of the stakes,'124 arbi-
trariness comes to dictate substantive law. The inevitable risk
and consequences of arbitrariness in the death penalty context, in
a way largely unparalleled in other contexts, has also been said to
rule out the possibility of the death penalty for any crime against
individuals not resulting in the death of the victim.' 25
This is simply not how the idea of the arbitrary, or any risk
thereof, operates in other contexts. Relatedly, and again without
reaching the merits, consider how the idea of arbitrariness in the
death penalty context is developed in one final respect: the single
juror holdout case. It has been said that "[a]pplication of the
death penalty on the basis of a single juror's vote is 'intuitively
disturbing.' . . . More important, it represents. . . a system that
can be described as arbitrary or capricious." 26 Thus, Justice Ste-
vens has argued that "[a] capital sentencing procedure that re-
quired the jury to return a death sentence if even a single juror
supported that outcome would be the 'height of arbitrariness. 1 27
Again, I have no quarrel with the merits of any such argument.
My point is that the interest-based context again makes a dra-
matic difference in the very meaning of arbitrary. Suppose some-
one imagined that the height of arbitrariness judgment by Justice
Stevens reflected merely a general rule that the judgment of
many peers should control the legal outcome, as opposed to the
judgment of merely one of their peers. 28 This would reflect a
largely context-insensitive judgment that it is arbitrary for the
one to, in effect, overrule the many.
But this context-insensitive interpretation of the meaning of
arbitrary clearly will not do in the context of the death penalty,
where the various interests are dramatically unique.' 29 Thus, it is
hardly surprising that for many observers, there can be a vast dif-
ference between isolated holdout jurors imposing, as opposed to
preventing the imposition of, the death penalty. The single hol-
dout juror may in the latter context be validated. Pennsylvania,
124. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
125. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. -_.. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008).
126. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 421 n.1 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 454 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
127. Id. at 420 (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 419-20 (citation omitted).
129. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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for example, "requires that the jury unanimously agree that no
mitigating circumstances exist and unanimously agree on a ver-
dict for a sentence of death."130 The Third Circuit pointed out the
obvious resulting asymmetry: "Thus, while a single Pennsylvania
juror can always prevent a death sentence, a single juror can nev-
er compel one .... ,,13" Allowing a single juror, in disagreement
with eleven peer jury members, to prevent the imposition a death
sentence is certainly not thought of as the height of arbitrari-
ness.
132
The death penalty context thus provides the starkest and
greatest contrast in the meaning of arbitrary to those found in
the typical administrative agency context.13  To oversimplify, this
reflects most importantly the difference in the various interests,
purposes, or stakes between deliberately executing a conscious
human person in the name of the public34 and, say, denying
someone a temporary recreational fishing license.
There certainly may be middle-ground cases between these ex-
tremes. Consider the administration of the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act 35 ("ERISA"), where the very meaning
of arbitrary is shaded to one degree or another. Courts in such
ERISA cases refer to "heightened,""36 or to "sliding scale," "3 or
130. See Hackett v. Price, 381 F.3d 281, 299 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9711(c)(1)(iv) (2004)).
131. Id.; see also Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708, 732 (7th Cir. 2001) ("In Illinois,
when a jury deliberates on the appropriateness of the death penalty at sentencing, its de-
cision must be unanimous. However, if a single juror votes against the death penalty, it
cannot be imposed.") (citing 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/9-1(g) (2001)).
132. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. See, for example, supra note 100 and accompanying text for a "highly deferential"
arbitrary and capricious standard in an administrative context.
134. See R. George Wright, The Death Penalty and the Way We Think Now, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 533, 536-37 (2000).
135. Pub. L. 93-906, 88 Stat. 829 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
136. Consider, for example, the fact-sensitive contexts involving possible funding and
administration conflicts of interest in ERISA benefit determinations, in Williams v. Bell-
South Telecomm. Co., 373 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 2004), where the court, under Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch's, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989), three-level review frame-
work, employed a "heightened arbitrary and capricious'" review where an ERISA plan
administrator had a conflict of interest (quoting HCA Health Servs. of Georgia, Inc. v.
Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 982, 993 (11th Cir. 2001)). See also Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that review of insurance
company's funding and administration of ERISA benefits is a "conflict that warrants a
heightened form of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review").
137. See, e.g., Pinto, 214 F.3d at 379 ("[Wie side with the majority of courts of appeals,
which apply a sliding scale method, intensifying the degree of scrutiny to match the degree
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even to nearly "de novo" zs versions of arbitrariness review with-
out acknowledging that the meaning of arbitrary-somewhere be-
tween "highly deferential' 39 and "approaching de novo"140 re-
view-has plainly and undeniably shifted, given the distinctive
interests, power relationships, and questions of control in such
cases.
V. CONCLUSION
We have explored above why the crucial legal idea of arbitrari-
ness and its close synonyms cannot be subjected to any conve-
nient dictionary-type definition. The multiple meanings of arbi-
trary must instead vary as the substantive legal contexts, with
their diverging purposes, interests, and stakes, vary. At various
points, it is clearly more accurate and insightful to say not that
arbitrary is used in the same way in two dramatically different
such contexts, but that its use and meaning vary dramatically
across such contexts.'4
Recognizing the reality of this slippage-and even transforma-
tion-in the meaning of "arbitrary" would be a step forward in
understanding the slipperiness and the murkiness of all the af-
fected legal subject matters. This would include any area of the
law tested for arbitrariness, and perhaps by related standards
such as "clearly erroneous," "unreasonableness," being "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence." More broadly, all areas of the
law employing any similarly meaning-altering terms may also be
subject to similar terminological and definitional murkiness.
But as our discussion of contextualism itself clearly indicates,
legal terms are not used, and do not change their meanings, in a
political and institutional vacuum. The purposes and interests
of the conflict.").
138. See id.
139. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
140. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 379. For significant burden-shifting in such cases, see
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 898 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1990).
141. See GARTH HALLETT, WITTGENSTEIN'S DEFINITION OF MEANING AS USE 3 (1967)
("The meaning of all expressions were their uses."); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 3d
ed. 1958) ("For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word
'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.") (em-
phasis in original). See generally A.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O.
Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1975).
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thought to be at stake in a given case, including the relevant po-
litical and ideological interests, are not fixed and unalterable. As
politics and perceptions of interests changes, so should the very
meaning of arbitrariness.12 One aspect of increasing political po-
larization43 may, predictably, be decreased consensus on the most
relevant purposes and interests, and on their weight or value, in
various legal contexts. Of course, if the Supreme Court were to
abolish the death penalty, that would, to some degree, increase
the clarity and consistency of meaning of arbitrary in the law.
With generally increased political polarization, though, we can
better understand and should generally expect further contest
and confusion over important legal terms.
142. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 67, at 767 ("Political commitments significantly
influence the operation of hard look review in EPA and NLRB cases."); see also STEPHEN
G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 240 (6th ed. 2006) (list-
ing other sorts of considerations that might affect the degree of deference a reviewing
court gives to an administrative agency's interpretation of a term).
143. See generally BILL BISHOP WITH ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE
CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2008); SEAN M. THERIAULT,
PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008).
20101

